a b s t r a c t
a b s t r a c t 26 The trust is always present implicitly in the protocols based on cooperation, in particular, between the 27 entities involved in routing operations in Ad hoc networks. Indeed, as the wireless range of such nodes 28 is limited, the nodes mutually cooperate with their neighbors in order to extend the remote nodes and 29 the entire network. In our work, we are interested by trust as security solution for OLSR protocol. This 30 approach fits particularly with characteristics of ad hoc networks. Moreover, the explicit trust manage- 31 ment allows entities to reason with and about trust, and to take decisions regarding other entities. 32 In this paper, we detail the techniques and the contributions in trust-based security in OLSR. We pres- 33 ent trust-based analysis of the OLSR protocol using trust specification language, and we show how trust- 34 based reasoning can allow each node to evaluate the behavior of the other nodes. After the detection of 35 misbehaving nodes, we propose solutions of prevention and countermeasures to resolve the situations of 36 inconsistency, and counter the malicious nodes. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our solution taking devices are constrained to cooperate so as not to be isolated. Later, 135 the same authors extended their cooperation system in order to 136 deal with devices that deliberately send false reputation scores 137 [11] . 138 Similarly, Michiardi et al. propose a cooperation enforcement 139 mechanism, called CORE (COllaborative REputation) [7] . Basically, 140 CORE uses a watchdog mechanism to allow each device to monitor 141 its neighbors. Based on its own observation as well as the scores 142 provided by other devices involved in the current operation, a de-143 vice can compute a reputation score for each of its neighbor, this 144 score represents the degree of cooperation. Then, when a selfish 145 device is detected, it is gradually denied network services. Thus, 146 a device cooperates, otherwise it can no longer use the MANET. 147 Notice that CORE allows to rehabilitate selfish devices if they be- node has to pay to use network services (forwarding its data), and 153 must be paid for offering services to other nodes. Thus, selfish 154 nodes will finish their nuglets and can no longer send packets. 155 The drawback of this method is that the nuglets are managed by 156 a centralized entity. 157 In brief, collaboration systems are based either on reputation 158 systems monitoring the neighbors' behavior to detect misbehaving 159 devices (e.g. selfish nodes), or on a virtual currency to enforce the 160 nodes to collaborate. However, in both cases, the solutions implic- 161 itly assume that the routing tables are correct. 162 However, other works propose reputation systems that can also 163 be applied for securing routing protocol by monitoring node 164 behavior, in order to verify that nodes respect the routing protocol 165 specification. For example, CORE [7] is suggested as a generic 166 mechanism and can be integrated with any network service. Pre- 167 cisely, Meka et al. [10] propose trust-based reputation model for 168 AODV. Reputation is calculated according to the degree of partici-169 pation in the routing protocol and the information it provides 170 about the network topology. Reputation system was also used as 171 a security method to perform trust-based multi-path routing 172 [13, 14] . Thus, they do not allow to detect a malicious node which 173 would be a normal behavior in terms of message routing, but a 174 misbehavior with respect to the ad hoc routing protocol. 175 To deal with compromised routing tables, the major part of the tion between the LIDS [22, 23] . The monitored events are generally 248 the neighbor behaviors, any misbehaviors being an intrusion. 249 Wang et al. [24] and Cuppens-Boulahia et al. [25] were inter-250 ested in securing OLSR protocol by using semantic properties of 251 the protocol. They propose an intrusion detection system for veri-252 fying the correctness of OLSR control messages. 253 Wang et al. [24] routes are consistent with the specification of OLSR, and thus they 275 do not ensure that it will not be detected as an inconsistency.
276
To our knowledge, only Wang et al. [24] and Cuppens-Boulahia 277 et al. [25] were interested in semantic properties in OLSR protocol.
278
Their approach is presented as an intrusion detection system. In has to select C as MPR, because it provides reachability to F. As D
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can also be reachable via C, then C will be the only MPR of A. node. This leads to a spreading of the trust placed in the MPRs.
675
Certain attacks against OLSR exploit the vulnerability resulting 676 from the absence of validation of this derived trust chain. The node input-output message flows [33] . This validation can be used to detect the attacks aimed at falsely In the case of multiple targets (Table 3B ) and attackers ( In summary, we demonstrated that our solution allows to verify 1301 if the behavior of other nodes in the network complies with the Table 3 Simulation results.
